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Federal immigration law and state family law seem about as
unrelated as two areas of law could be. One involves national identity
and foreign policy; the other involves the most local of institutions - the
family. But the two areas actually are interrelated in pervasive and
significant ways.1 One example of this interrelation occurs in cases
where state court judges adjudicate custody disputes involving
immigrant parents. The vast majority of states use a "best interests of the
child" standard to determine what custody arrangements are appropriate
in contested cases of all kinds. The "best interests" inquiry frequently
requires courts to consider the relationship the child has with each parent
and the child's physical and emotional needs.2 The question judges find
themselves asking when a custody case involves an immigrant parent is
"can or should the immigration status of a parent be considered in
applying the best interests standard?"
Just this past year, the Nevada Supreme Court answered that
question with a qualified "yes." In Rico v. Rodriguez, the court affirmed
a family court decision granting custody of two children to their father, a
Mexican immigrant who was a legal resident of the United States, in part
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2 See, e.g., Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act, § 402 (as amended, 1973) (listing
five factors as relevant to a best interests determination: (1) the wishes of the
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because of their mother's undocumented immigrant status. 3 Although
the Rico court's opinion limited the use of immigration status to cases
where it was one of many factors, the opinion serves as an example of
how damaging a state court's misperceptions about federal immigration
law can be, and shows how these misperceptions can significantly affect
the outcome in child custody cases.
This essay does not attempt to critique the final outcome of the Rico
case. Child custody cases are very difficult, fact-based inquiries, and it
is difficult to determine with certainty what the best outcome would have
been without having heard testimony first hand, and even then,
reasonable people might disagree. What this essay does do is to identify
the analytic problems with the Rico court's treatment of immigration
status, and to use the case as an opportunity to consider how courts and
legislatures could improve the way in which they consider immigration
status in child custody cases.
In his article in this volume, You Can't Go Here From Here: Toward
a Child-Centered Immigration System, David Thronson outlines the
ways in which our current immigration system short-changes the needs
of immigrant children and children of immigrants.4 In his previous
work, Professor Thronson has also analyzed the way in which children of
undocumented immigrant parents are treated in family court, the effects
of deportation on the parent-child relationship, and how federal
immigration law conceives of children's rights.5 This essay builds on
Professor Thronson's entire body of work, asking the question: what role
should a parent's immigration status play in a custody dispute?
I conclude that in most cases the immigration status of a parent is
likely to be an irrelevant factor in determining the best interests of the
child; if anything, it will serve the dangerous function of as acting as a
repository for the unconscious biases and punitive impulses of judges
against immigrant parents. In some cases, however, such as where there
3 120 P.3d 812 (Nev. 2005).4 Supra at 
_.
5 See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices.: Deportation and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 6 Nev. L. J. 1165 (2006); David B. Thronson & Victoria
Tobar Thronson, Immigrants and the Family Courts, 14 Nev. Law. 30 (January
2006); David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 Texas
Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y. 47 (2005); David B. Thronson, Kids will be Kids?
Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law,
63 Ohio St. L.J. 979 (2002).
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is evidence that an immigrant parent is about to be deported and intends
to take the child with him or her to a jurisdiction where the other parent
will not be able to assert legal custody or visitation rights, immigration
status would be relevant to a "best interests" inquiry. I propose a
solution to the dilemma of when to consider immigration status in the
form of a rebuttable presumption that immigration status cannot be used
as a factor in the best interests analysis. The presumption could be
rebutted in specific classes of cases (like the one outlined above) where
immigration status is likely to be highly probative and unlikely to be
used for prejudicial reasons. The essay proceeds as follows: Part I
gives a brief description of the Rico v. Rodriguez case; Part II outlines
some of the problems with courts' use of immigration status as a best
interests factor, and Part III offers the rebuttable presumption solution.
I. THE CASE OF RICO V. RODRIGUEZ
In many ways, Rico v. Rodriguez was a typical custody battle
between two unmarried parents: on one side was the mother, Araceli
Perez Rico, on the other was the father, Jose Rodriguez, and caught in
the middle were their two children, M.P. and J.P. But Rico was different
than many custody cases because both Ms. Rico and Mr. Rodriguez were
immigrants from Mexico.
M.P. and J.P. were born when Ms. Rico and Mr. Rodriguez both still
lived in Mexico. 6 When M.P. was three and J.P. was one, Mr. Rodriguez
left Ms. Rico and immigrated to the United States. After arriving, he
married a United States citizen and obtained permanent resident status (a
"green card"). Ms. Rico thereafter had primary physical custody of the
children for seven years. In 2003, Ms. Rico and her children moved to
Las Vegas seeking child support from Mr. Rodriguez, and contacted him
to ask if they could live with him.8 Mr. Rodriguez responded the way
fathers presented with child support questions often respond: by suing
for custody of M.P. and J.P. 9 The trial court ordered home studies of
6 120 P.3d at 814-15.
7 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154 (2006) (any
citizen claiming an alien is entitled to "immediate relative" status as described in
INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i) may file a petition with the Attorney General for such
status); INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (spouses of U.S.
citizens qualify as "immediate relatives").
8 120 P.3dat 815.
9 120 P.3d at 815; see also Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families:
Family Policy Trapped in its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
619, 624 (1987-88) (noting that child support actions may "prompt fathers to
retaliate and counter-sue for custody"); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of
Family Law, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 229, 266 (2000) (arguing that a mother might
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each parent that showed that although the father was wealthier, each
parent could provide a suitable home for the children.10 Yet Mr.
Rodriguez, who had expressed no interest in or support for his children
until Ms. Rico arrived in the United States, was granted primary physical
custody." Ms. Rico was merely awarded visitation."
How did this happen? A good part of the court's decision seems to
have been motivated by factors that often influence judges in best
interests of the child determinations. Mr. Rodriguez was married, but
Ms. Rico lived with her boyfriend. 13 Mr. Rodriguez and his wife lived in
a "modest but adequate" home, but Ms. Rico lived in a trailer with
several other people.1 4 While still in Mexico, Ms. Rico was a single,
working mother, so her mother (the children's grandmother) had
frequently taken care of them, and the older child helped the other one by
dressing and feeding him.' 5 Finally, the younger child had a health
problem - a speech impediment. 16 The district judge granted primary
physical custody to Mr. Rodriguez largely because he thought that Ms.
Rico was not economically stable enough to provide adequate medical
care, whereas the father was employed and had access to medical
insurance. 17 (Why Mr. Rodriguez could not have named his children as
insureds on his policy without obtaining full custody of them was not
explained).' 8
prefer to forgo her right to collect support out of fear that the father will retaliate
against her, either through threats of violence or by countersuing for custody of
the child).







18 It appears that the court erroneously assumed that Mr. Rodriguez would be
unable to name his children as insureds or covered persons on his insurance
policy. The Nevada legislature clearly views child support (including insurance
access) and child custody as separate issues. State law provides that "every
court order for the support of a child. .. must include a provision specifying
whether the parent required to pay support is required to provide coverage for
the health care of the child." Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 125B.085 (LexisNexis
2004). In other words, a noncustodial parent ordered to pay child support to the
custodial parent could also be ordered to enroll the child on his or her insurance.
Once such an order is in place, an insurance company must permit its employee
to enroll his or her child as an insured. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 608.1576(LexisNexis 2006).
[Vol. 14:1
Fall 2006] Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child 91
In addition to these other factors, the court used Ms. Rico and Mr.
Rodriguez's respective immigration statuses as a factor in deciding that
custody should go to Mr. Rodriguez. Ms. Rico and the children were in
the country without legal status, while Mr. Rodriguez had permanent
resident status as the spouse of a citizen.19 Status was relevant in a best
interests analysis, the court held, because Mr. Rodriguez's legal
permanent resident status made him eligible to sponsor his children for
citizenship.2 0 But Mr. Rodriguez could not have sponsored his children
for citizenship, regardless of whether he had custody of them, because he
was not a citizen himself.
Instead, as a permanent resident, Mr. Rodriguez could have
sponsored the children for permanent resident status.2 1 Because Mr.
Rodriguez was not married to the children's mother, he would have
needed to prove something beyond mere biological fatherhood in order
to confer resident status on his children.2 But that something was not
that he had primary custody of the children. Rather, he could sponsor
them for residency by doing one of two things: (1) legitimating the
children or (2) creating a "bona fide parent-child relationship" with
them. 3 A "bona fide" relationship could be shown through evidence of
financial support, correspondence between parties, or notarized affidavits
of friends, neighbors, or others who knew of the relationship. 4 In other
words, it was in Mr. Rodriguez's power (and had been for quite some
time) to sponsor his children for permanent residency regardless of
custody.
Even if Mr. Rodriguez was unable to demonstrate a bona fide
relationship, there was another avenue available for residency for his
children. His wife, as a citizen, could sponsor the children for residency
as their stepmother.25 Again, she would have had this opportunity
19 120 P.3d at 815.
20 Id. at 816.
21 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (2006)
(unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents can be sponsored
for permanent residency).
22 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2006)
ldefinition of "child").
3 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(C)-(D), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1 101(b)(1)(C)-(D) (2006).
24 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii) (2006).
25 Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2006)
(child of U.S. citizen eligible for resident status); INA § 101(b)(1)(B) ("child"
includes a "stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child
had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the
status of stepchild occurred").
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regardless of the custody arrangement so long as Mr. Rodriguez was
found to be the children's legal father.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Nevada expressly found that the
district court erroneously interpreted federal immigration law.26 When
ruling on Ms. Rico's due process claim, the court even stated that "Rico
and Rodriguez stood on equal footing before the district court," and that
"[n]othing in the record indicates that the district court's ultimate
decision turned primarily on Rico's immigration status," thereby
implying that a decision based solely on immigration status might have
violated Ms. Rico's due process rights.27 But because immigration status
was officially simply one of many factors used in the determination, the
court found the district court's use of the factor harmless, and its ultimate
decision acceptable.28
II. THREE PROBLEMS
The Rico case provides a good jumping-off point for analyzing the
problems with using immigration status as a best interests factor. The
problems can be loosely grouped into three categories: (1) state courts'
lack of expertise regarding immigration law; (2) the risk that judges will
engage in "double-counting" of other factors (such as employment
opportunity or income); and (3) the possibility that judges will use the
best interests test to punish an undocumented migrant for violating
immigration law. In this section, I address each problem in turn.
A. LACK OF EXPERTISE
Federal immigration law involves a knotty and complex set of
statutes and case law. The main immigration statute, the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA") is hundreds of pages long and written in a
highly-technical manner that can be opaque and confusing to outsiders.
Even intelligent and experienced judges can have a difficult time
understanding the provisions of the INA, especially if their practice does
not normally involve interpreting it. As shown above, the district court
26 120 P.3d at 816 ("Apparently, in attempting to understand [the effects of
immigration status], the district court erroneously interpreted a federal
immigration law by mistakenly relying on a memorandum of law prepared by
Rodriguez's counsel").27Id. at 817-18.
28 Id. ("After balancing all the factors, including, but not limited to, Rico's
immigration status, the district court determined that it was in the children's best
interests to live with Rodriguez.").
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in the Rico case failed to understand the consequences of both parties'
immigration status. In the Rico case, the consequences the trial court
cared about were the children's chances of obtaining U.S. citizenship. In
other cases, courts have misapprehended other consequences of
immigration law to similar ill effect.
One common state court misunderstanding is that undocumented, or
"illegal," status means that a person is in imminent or likely danger of
being deported. In one case, for example, a trial court terminated a
father's rights "based on the possibility that the father could someday be
deported., 29  But the chances of an undocumented immigrant like Ms.
Rico being apprehended by federal authorities and put into removal
proceedings are exceedingly small - less than 1%.30 In fact, to use the
Rico facts as an example, the statistical chance that Mr. Rodrigeuz would
commit a crime and go to prison was probably higher than Ms. Rico's
chance of being deported.3' Yet courts do not use a man's greater
theoretical likelihood of incarceration as a rationale for denying his
children access to him or for placing custody with someone else.
The "undocumented status means likely deportation" theory is
wrong for a host of other reasons as well. Even in the unlikely event that
someone in Ms. Rico's shoes was put into removal proceedings, she
might be eligible for "cancellation of removal." One of the factors in
granting an undocumented immigrant cancellation of removal is the
existence of family ties in the United States, which Ms. Rico would have
had if Mr. Rodriguez had taken some minimal steps to obtain legal
permanent residency for the children. 32 If she were successful on her
29 In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. App. 2003).
30 In 2000, there were 7,000,000 unauthorized immigrants in the United States.
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, Table 7. In that
year, 184,775 people were deported (including people who were here legally,
but committed a crime), and many of those deported were simply removed
immediately after their arrival. DHS Office of Immigration Statistics annual
report Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2000, Ch. 6 at 4. Of those
unauthorized immigrants who, like Ms. Rico, had been living here for over one
year, only 42,000 were removed - only 0.6% of the unauthorized migrant
population. Id. at 6.
In 2000, 4% of Hispanic men and 1.7% of while men in their twenties and
early thirties were incarcerated. Allen J. Beck & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison
and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (March
2001) at *1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf.
32 Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b (2006). The
requirements for cancellation of removal for an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable are (1) she has been physically present in the U.S. for continuous
period of not less than 10 years; (2) she has been a person of good moral
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cancellation claim, she would be eligible to adjust her status to that of
legal permanent resident.33
Finally, even in cases where deportation of one parent is likely, it is
unclear that the fact of deportation cuts in the direction of giving custody
to the parent who will remain in the U.S. Family court decisions
involving immigrants often include evidence of a shortsighted "U.S. is
best" mentality.34 In the Rico case, given that Mr. Rodriguez does not
appear to have been physically or emotionally present in his children's
lives, it is unclear why separation from him if their mother had been
deported would have been worse than losing contact with their mother.
If Ms. Rico had been deported, she might have taken her children back to
Mexico with her, and they would have grown up there instead of in the
U.S. Many people who do not live in the United States nevertheless lead
full and productive lives.
B. DOUBLE-COUNTING
The use of immigration status as a factor in a "best interests of the
child" analysis also creates a danger of double-counting, and double-
counting of a particularly pernicious kind, at that. The best interests test
is a balancing test: once it has been decided that both parents are fit
parents, the court then asks "which parent is better?" Each parent is
likely to have positive and negative qualities, and so courts essentially
add each quality up and then decide who will provide the better
environment overall. If one negative factor gets counted twice (or three
or four) times against a parent, it can make a significant impact on the
result in the case.
character during that period; (3) she has not been convicted of certain criminal
offenses; and (4) she establishes that removal would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to her spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen or
lawful permanent resident. § 240A(b)(1), § 1229b(1).
33 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(l).
34 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E. 2d 825, 832 (Ga. App. 2003) (reversing
termination of father's rights where district court had determined that if the
father were deported "the child could ... be returned to protective custody or
taken with her father to 'an unknown future in Mexico'). In a slightly different
context, the legal scholar Leti Volpp named this attitude "West is Best." Leti
Volpp, Talking "Culture ": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1573, 1604-05 (1996) (critiquing
presumptions that the United States is "per se more progressive and more
protective of women and children than the culture of Asian and African
immigrants...."). "U.S. is best," while less catchy than "West is Best," may
more accurately describe the mentality of family court judges in cases involving
immigrants from Mexico or other Latin American countries.
[Vol. 14:1
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In Rico, a form of double-counting seems to have occurred. The
court based its determination on Mr. Rodriguez's employment, his
ability to provide medical insurance and stable schooling, and Ms. Rico's
immigration status.35  But Ms. Rico's problems with maintaining
employment and obtaining health insurance flowed directly from her
undocumented immigration status. And as shown above, her
immigration status did not affect her children's ability to obtain
residency or citizenship, nor did it make her extraordinarily vulnerable to
dislocation. The only legitimate purpose for considering her
immigration status served the same purpose that considering her
employment record, income, access to insurance, or access to schooling
served, and the immigration status factor essentially duplicated these
others. Other courts have been more careful; in one custody case
appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court insisted that the
mother's immigration status was not relevant "except insofar as it has
affected her ability to obtain transportation and employment." 36 In other
words, the transportation and employment issues were important, and it
would be impossible to consider them without understanding the context
in which they arose. But the court did not treat immigration status as a
separate factor to be taken into consideration in its "best interests"
analysis.
Double-counting is particularly troubling because the factors that are
double-counted are typically factors that are already prime suspects for
the importation of race- and class-based bias into the custody
determination. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this problem in a
different context: when social workers of middle-class backgrounds
make a choice between leaving a child with a foster family or returning
the child to his or her biological parents, studies show that they "reflect[]
a bias that treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial
to the best interests of the child. 37 Indeed, it was these very biases that
led to wholesale removal of Native American children from their tribes
until the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act.38
When a court uses immigration status to double-count a factor such
as poor employment prospects, poverty, or lack of education or family
ties, the court is not only double-counting but double-counting the very
" 120 P.3d at 815.
36 In re Interest of Aaron D, 691 N.W. 2d 164, 167 (2005).
37 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977).38 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901, etseq. (2006).
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factors that are the most troubling. Again, the Rico case is worth looking
at closely. The Nevada statute that the Rico court was applying made no
explicit reference to immigration status as a factor to be used in the best
interests test. Neither was there a reference to employment history,
economic condition, or education level. The Nevada statute, like most
best interests statutes, used broader categories, including: which parent is
more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a
continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent; the ability of the
parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child; the mental and
physical health of the parents; the physical, developmental and emotional
needs of the child; and the nature of the relationship of the child with
each parent.
39
In the Rico case, the piece of the Nevada statute that best tracks the
analysis undertaken by the court is the "physical, developmental, and
emotional needs of the child" factor. The other facts that may have made
a difference to the court in Rico (the trailer in which Ms. Rico lived; her
nonmarital relationship with her boyfriend versus her husband's married
status; her giving the children to their grandmother to care for while she
worked) are more difficult to place. They could have been considered,
perhaps, under the "physical, developmental and emotional needs of the
child" or the "nature of the relationship of the child with each parent."
The court appears to have completely bypassed what is usually the
central inquiry under the "nature of the relationship of the child with
each parent" factor: who was the children's primary caregiver
previously? With whom did the children actually have an established
relationship? The court faulted Ms. Rico for leaving the children with
her mother, but no mention was made of the father's complete lack of
involvement, financial support, or interest in the children until Ms. Rico
showed up in the United States asking for help. Instead, the court went
directly to evaluating which household presented a more favorable
environment for a child in theory, and, predictably, found Ms. Rico's
trailer home to be less desirable than Mr. Rodriguez's house. Added to
this mix, Ms. Rico's undocumented immigration status may have been
the factor that tipped the scales in Mr. Rodriguez's favor. Adding
immigration status as a factor made it appear that the court has
undertaken a multi-factor analysis, when in reality it had ignored many
of the factors courts usually consider the most important and double-
counted those that are most likely to reflect the prejudices of the
individual judge.
39 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.480 (4)(c), (e)-(h) (2006).
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C. ANIMUS
Courts are nearly universal on the proposition that the "best
interests" standard is about what is best for the children, not what is best
for the parents. As another Nevada Supreme Court opinion, cited by the
Rico court, explained: "This court has made it clear that a court may not
use changes of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct.''4 Yet
in the case of undocumented immigrants, that is precisely what appears
to be happening. Sometimes the punitive motive is transparent, but in
other cases it may be more difficult to discern. As an example of a
transparent desire to punish, one judge told a father that he "had a
problem with his INS situation" and that the father would have to
"resolve" the issue before he could have custody of his child.41 Of
course, a person does not have complete control over his immigration
status: in that case, the father had no grounds for applying for legal
immigration status, so the court conditioned custody on something
outside his control. But regardless of whether the father was delinquent
in obtaining legal status, the question the court needed to consider was
whether the child would be better off with the father.
In the Rico case, the motive to punish is less clear. The trial court
record is spotty, and there is no language in the Supreme Court case that
indicates that the trial court wanted to punish Ms. Rico for her status.
Yet the court's use of immigration status as a factor casts a pall over the
case. Given the prejudice against immigrants - especially against
"illegal aliens" - in our society, it is very difficult to ever be certain that
a judge who considers immigration status fair game in a best interests
analysis is not doing it to punish the undocumented parent, or out of a
prejudice against undocumented people.
III. A SOLUTION
The myriad problems associated with using immigration status as a
best interests factor point to several possible solutions. Courts and
legislatures could abolish consideration of immigration status altogether.
Or they could establish guidelines for how to use status without falling
into the traps outlined above. The first approach would be problematic
because there may well be some circumstances in which immigration
status is highly relevant, as I explain below. But the second approach is
also dangerous because it still gives credence to the idea that
40 Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149 (1993).
41 In re M.M., 587 S.E. 2d 825, 831 (Ga. App. 2003).
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immigration status is often a legitimate factor to consider. As Dorothy
Roberts has shown, vague standards coupled with unbridled discretion
function as an "invitation to racial bias" in the family court system.42
Such tests essentially ask a judge to follow his or her hunches about what
kind of environment would be optimal for a child. What sometimes gets
lost in the calculus is the value to children of remaining with the parent
with whom they have bonded.
I would propose the following solution to this dilemma: a
presumption that immigration status is not relevant in child custody
disputes, coupled with specific classes of cases in which the presumption
could be rebutted. This is, in fact, the approach that some courts have
taken, although they have not named it as such.43 A presumption has the
virtue of being clear and of taking the form of an admonition. If judges
understand the reasons a presumption is necessary (lack of expertise,
double-counting, and potential for animus), they may be less likely to
engage in the kind of prejudicial, hunch-based decision making that the
Rico court appears to have done. Of course, there will always be judges
who do not like undocumented immigrants, and there is nothing to stop
them from disguising their animus by giving greater weight to other
factors. But for most judges, a rebuttable presumption would be a
reminder that their instincts may be contrary to the best interests of
children.
When should the presumption be rebuttable? There are many classes
of cases in which immigration status might be highly probative of best
interests, in ways that would not double-count other considerations.
What follows is a preliminary list of the kinds of cases in which the
presumption might be rebutted. This list is not intended to be
exhaustive; there may be other important exceptions that will arise in
cases yet to be decided. It is meant merely to provide examples of the
types of narrow exceptions to the general presumption against use of
status that would make sense in child custody cases.
42 Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare 55 (2002).43 See, e.g, In re Aaron D., 691 N.W. 2d 164, 167 (Neb. 2005) (noting that the
mother's immigration status was relevant only "insofar as it has affected her
ability to obtain transportation and employment.").
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A. CASES WHERE REMOVAL IS IMMINENT
As discussed above, there is a wide misperception that an
undocumented immigrant is in constant danger of apprehension and
removal. This alone would not be a good reason to consider status. But
in some cases, an order of removal has actually been entered. In these
cases, the parent's imminent deportation would have to be a factor in a
best interests analysis. Joint custody, for example, would be impossible
unless the other parent also moved, which might not be feasible or
desirable. A court would also need to consider the living conditions in
which the child would be raised if she accompanied her deported parent
back to his or her country of origin. Of course, this inquiry would not
necessary lead to the conclusion that "U.S. is best." For example,
perhaps the parent in removal proceedings has extensive family ties in
the country of origin, and the U.S.-based parent does not have any in the
U.S. On these facts, a court might determine that it would be best for the
parent who will be deported to have custody of the children, because he
or she will have greater access to the support of an extended family and
community. Factors such as these would be crucial to determining what
the life of the child would be like in the parent's home country, and a
court doing a best interest analysis would need to take them into account.
In many of these cases, the best way to preserve family ties may be
to have the children live abroad with the deported parent: the U.S.-based
parent will likely have little trouble obtaining a visa to visit the children,
but the deported parent would have to wait years before being eligible to
reenter the United States. In the Rico case this was certainly true: Mr.
Rodriguez could have visited Mexico frequently, but Ms. Rico, once
deported, could not have visited her children for at least 10 years.4 4
B. CASES WHERE ONE PARENT IS LIKELY TO KIDNAP THE CHILD
A second instance in which the presumption could be rebutted would
be in cases where one of the parents has demonstrated a propensity to
kidnap the child. Several cases like this have occurred, and courts have
usually done an admirable job of weighing the immigration status of one
44 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2006). Even once the 10-year statutory bar had elapsed, Ms.
Rico might have had difficulty convincing a consular officer to issue her a visa:
given her history of deportation and the existence of her children in the United
States, a consular office might suspect that Ms. Rico did not have a "residence
in a foreign country which [s]he [had] no intention of abandoning," a
requirement for most nonimmigrant visas. See, e.g., Immigration and
Nationality Act, § 101 (a)(15)(B).
100 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 14:1
parent as a factor without succumbing to the problems outlined above.
In one case, for example, an appellate court reversed a family court
decision giving sole custody to the German mother of a child. The
mother was in the U.S. on a tourist visa, so she would not have been able
to remain legally much longer. She was also a physician with a job in
Germany, so she was likely to return to her job. In addition, she had a
track record of absconding with her children: she had previously
removed the children from New York to Florida, in direct contravention
of a family court order, and a court-appointed psychologist expressed
concern that she seemed likely to return to Germany.45 In cases like this
one, where there are several reasons to believe that one parent is likely to
leave with the children, immigration status may be relevant insofar as it
contributes to this likelihood. This exception to the presumption would
have to be used with care, however. There is a danger that it could be
used as a loophole for injecting prejudice against unauthorized
immigrants into child custody cases. There is no evidence that the
undocumented, as a class, are more likely to kidnap their children than
anyone else.
C. CASES WHERE ONE PA RENT HA S STRATEGICALLY
WITHHELD IMMIGRATION SPONSORSHIP FROM SPOUSE OR CHILDREN
Advocates for battered spouses and children have long noticed a
disturbing and unintended side effect of immigration law's use of citizen
and resident spouses as "sponsors" of immigrant spouses: the strategic
withholding of immigration status by the citizen spouse to maintain
dominance in a relationship. In order to obtain a family-based immigrant
visa, an immigrant needs his or her citizen or resident relative to act as a
46sponsor. In some cases (often but not always involving domestic
violence), the citizen spouse chooses to withhold sponsorship as a means
of maintaining control over the immigrant spouse. Indeed, these cases
were the reason for the passage of VAWA 2000. As explained in the
Congressional Record, the Act removed "obstacles ... that may hinder or
prevent battered immigrants from fleeing domestic violence safely and
prosecuting their abusers by allowing an abusive citizen or lawful
41 In re Ish-Shalom v. Wittmann, 19 A.D.3d 493, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005);
see also Abdel-Rahman v. Abdel-Rahman, 1996 WL 33362252 (Mich. App.
1996).46 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) (2006).
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permanent resident [spouse] to blackmail the abused spouse through
threats related to the abused spouse's immigration status. 47
The failure of one party to sponsor the other for citizenship would
certainly not be dispositive in a best interests analysis. There are many
reasons that someone might not sponsor a relative, ranging from
ignorance of the opportunity to acquiescence to the wishes of the other
parent. But the failure could be relevant in some contexts. First, if the
failure to sponsor a spouse or children was coupled with some evidence
of physical or emotional abuse, the withholding of immigration status
could be corroborating evidence of abuse. Because Congress has found
that perpetuators of spousal abuse often use the withholding of
immigration status as a weapon in keeping the battered spouse under
control, failure to sponsor a spouse, especially over a long period of
time, should be viewed with suspicion.
Second, failure to sponsor a child could be an important fact to
consider as part of analyzing the "nature of the relationship between the
child and each parent. ''48 The failure of one parent to sponsor his or her
children for residency or citizenship when the capability was there could
be a red flag that the parent (1) does not have a genuine interest in
custody and is using the threat of a custody battle to force the other party
to settle for less than optimal child support or alimony or (2) that the
parent really had very little contact with the child previous to the dispute.
In the Rico case, an answer to the question of why Mr. Rodriguez had
not already sponsored his children for permanent residency might have
provided the court much more probative information about the children's
best interests than Ms. Rico's undocumented status did.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Thronson has so aptly shown, immigration law and
family law are converging in ways that could potentially have dire
consequences for children. Courts must find ways to be attentive to the
ways in which the immigration status of parents can affect the well-being
of children, but they also must be wary of the pitfalls of allowing
prejudices about immigrants and misperceptions about immigration law
47 146 Cong. Rec. S10,188, S10,192 (2000). Under the Act, a battered
immigrant spouse can self-petition for immigration status, thus engaging in an
end-run around the citizen spouse. Immigration and Nationality Act §
204(a)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(iii) (2006).
48 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.480 (2006).
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to govern custody determinations., This essay has proposed one solution
to one piece of the problem: a rebuttable presumption against the use of
immigration status in child custody determinations that will allow courts
to exercise self-restraint while still making the consideration of
immigration status available in exceptional circumstances.
